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Abstract 
This article offers a cognitive framework for thinking about the confluence 
of uncertainty and the IHL rules governing targeting. In abstract discussions, the 
tendency has been to understand the requisite level of certainty for engaging a target 
as a particular threshold, that is, as “certain enough” to satisfy the requirement to 
confirm a target as a military objective, qualify harm as collateral damage or 
military advantage that must be factored into the proportionality calculation, or 
require the taking of feasible precautions in attack to minimize harm to civilians 
and civilian objects. In our view, this approach neither reflects targeting practice, 
nor adequately operationalizes the balance between humanitarian considerations 
and military necessity that all “conduct of hostilities” rules must reflect. 
We suggest that the issue is more nuanced, that dealing with uncertainty 
involves a multifaceted situational assessment when planning, approving or 
executing attacks. The article is our attempt to widen the aperture of discussion 
about battlefield ambiguity and doubt. To do so, we consider target confirmation, 
proportionality and precautions in attack, offering a way to think about uncertainty 
with respect to each.  
Our approaches to uncertainty are represented in the form of mathematical 
formulae. We have employed this mechanism to better capture the connected and 
interdependent relationship of the variables that are at play in a targeting decision, 
for targeting is a dynamic process characterized by situation-specific decision-
making. The formulae should not be viewed as an attempt to reduce targeting 
decisions to mechanical deterministic calculations. The goal is to spark discussion 
about how to consider the uncertainty that infuses many targeting operations in a 
way that reflects the reality of, and practice on, the battlefield; we do not hope to 
definitively settle the matter. 
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I. Introduction 
The fog of war has been a persistent reality of warfare for millennia.1 
Despite extraordinary technological advances that render the battlespace ever more 
transparent, such as night vision capabilities, satellite imagery and remotely piloted 
aircraft equipped with complex sensor suites, that fog is unlikely to lift anytime 
soon. On the contrary, as the means to address battlefield uncertainty advance, the 
development of methods for countering them, some quite simple, march on in 
lockstep. For instance, organized armed groups that are asymmetrically 
disadvantaged in terms of conventional warfare have grasped that failing to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population complicates their enemy’s 
targeting, especially when that enemy is committed to compliance with the 
international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of distinction.2 Similarly, 
disadvantaged groups intentionally fight in proximity to civilians, thereby 
frustrating both their adversary’s target verification3 and its assessment as to the 
proportionality4 of prospective attacks. Sometimes, it is the mere nature of armed 
conflict, rather than the actions of its participants, that produces the fog of war. Of 
particular note in this regard is the global trend towards urbanization, which means 
that future conflict will increasingly be conducted in densely populated battlespaces 
that are fertile environments for uncertainty.5 
Those who have experienced combat, especially in recent conflicts like the 
ones underway in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, understand the reality of uncertainty 
all too well. As explained in the US Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual 
(DoD Manual): 
                                                 
1 KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 101 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press indexed ed. 1984) (1976). 
2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP 
I]; Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62 THE A.F. 
L. REV. 1, 14 (2008). With respect to customary law, see 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, rr. 3–8 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswold-Beck eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter CIHL STUDY]; see also OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. L. OF WAR 
MANUAL § 2.5 (rev. ed. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. U.S. positions on the law 
are especially relevant to the customary status of AP I provisions as the United States is not a party 
to AP I. Moreover, the United States generally accepts the AP I provisions cited in this article as 
reflective of customary international law; substantive departure will be highlighted. 
3 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(i); 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 16; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
supra note 2, at § 5.6. 
4 AP I, supra note 2, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 18; DOD 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.12. 
5 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY OPERATING CONCEPT: WIN IN A COMPLEX WORLD 
12 (2014), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/367967.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB96-36DD]; U.K. 
MINISTRY OF DEF., STRATEGIC TRENDS PROGRAMME: FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 2035 25 
(2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/607612/20150731-
FOE_35_Final_v29-VH.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BE3-5MQ4]. 
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The special circumstances of armed conflict often make an accurate 
determination of facts very difficult. For example, combatants must 
make decisions while enemy forces are attempting to attack them 
and while enemy forces are seeking to deceive them. In addition, the 
importance of prevailing during armed conflict often justifies taking 
actions based upon limited information that would be considered 
unreasonable outside armed conflict.6 
This article offers a cognitive framework for thinking about the confluence 
of uncertainty and the IHL rules governing targeting. In abstract discussions, the 
tendency has been to understand the requisite level of certainty for engaging a target 
as a particular threshold, that is, as “certain enough” to satisfy the requirement to 
confirm a target as a military objective,7 qualify harm as collateral damage or 
military advantage that must be factored into the proportionality calculation,8 or 
require the taking of feasible precautions in attack to minimize harm to civilians 
and civilian objects.9 In our view, this approach neither reflects targeting practice, 
nor adequately operationalizes the balance between humanitarian considerations 
and military necessity that all “conduct of hostilities” rules must reflect.10 
We suggest that the issue is more nuanced, that dealing with uncertainty 
involves a multifaceted situational assessment when planning, approving or 
executing attacks. The article is our attempt to widen the aperture of discussion 
about battlefield ambiguity and doubt. To do so, we consider target confirmation, 
proportionality and precautions in attack, offering a way to think about uncertainty 
with respect to each. Although discussed in the context of international armed 
conflict, the conclusions set forth apply mutatis mutandis to uncertainty that arises 
when applying IHL rules during non-international armed conflict. 
Before proceeding, several cautionary notes are in order. Our approaches to 
uncertainty are represented in the form of mathematical formulae. We have 
employed this mechanism to better capture the connected and interdependent 
relationship of the variables that are at play in a targeting decision, for targeting is 
a dynamic process characterized by situation-specific decision-making. The 
formulae should not be viewed as an attempt to reduce targeting decisions to 
mechanical deterministic calculations. To do so would badly distort our intent. 
                                                 
6 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.3.1. 
7 AP I, supra note 2, art. 52; 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 7; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra 
note 2, § 5.6. 
8 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(5)(b); 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 14; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
supra note 2, § 5.10. 
9 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57; 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 15; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra 
note 2, § 5.11. 
10 Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 798–99 (2010). “Conduct of hostilities” is 
a term of art within international humanitarian law that refers primarily to those rules governing 
attacks. 
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In this regard, we make no effort to identify either a precise threshold or the 
particular point along a sliding scale at which sufficient certainty has been achieved 
to attack a target as planned. Thus, we do not evaluate standards such as “more 
likely than not” or “positive identification.” Rather, as explained, the article only 
sets forth a cognitive framework for thinking about how uncertainty factors into the 
targeting process. It is for others to determine when certainty thresholds have been 
reached, typically the “reasonable” commander or others involved in targeting 
decisions and execution. We also caution readers that our thoughts are somewhat 
tentative. The goal is to spark discussion about how to consider the uncertainty that 
infuses many targeting operations in a way that reflects the reality of, and practice 
on, the battlefield; we do not hope to definitively settle the matter. 
II. Determination that a Target is a Military Objective 
The customary international law principle of distinction that is reflected in 
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I requires parties to a conflict to “distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly . . . direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”11 This principle has been operationalized in the prohibitions on 
attacking civilians and civilian objects set forth in Articles 51(2) and 52(1), 
respectively, both of which reflect customary law.12 
In the targeting context, civilians are those persons who are neither 
members of the armed forces13 nor members of an organized armed group.14 They 
may only be attacked “for such time” as they “take a direct part in the hostilities.”15 
As to qualification as a member of an organized armed group for targeting 
purposes, a complicating factor derives from a controversy surrounding the 
requisite role of an individual in such a group. Although many commentators and 
States, including the authors, are of the view that any member of an organized 
                                                 
11 See also U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2004, JSP 383, 
at ¶ 2.5 [hereinafter U.K. MANUAL]; CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-
021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 403 (2001) 
[hereinafter CANADIAN MANUAL]; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL. AND CONFLICT RES., 
MANUAL ON INT’L L. APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, r. 10 (2009) [hereinafter AMW 
MANUAL]; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL 
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 10–11 (2006); 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INT’L L. APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, r. 93 (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
12 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, rr. 1, 10. 
13 AP I, supra note 2, art. 50(1). 
14 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 36 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]. 
15 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(3); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 6. 
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armed group is targetable per se,16 the International Committee of the Red Cross’s 
(ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
takes the position that only those members of the group having a “continuous 
combat function” are so targetable.17 Accordingly, for those adopting the latter 
position, an additional question after determining that a person belongs to an 
organized armed group involved in the conflict is that individual’s role therein; 
should it not be a continuous function involving combat, the individual will be 
treated as a civilian for targeting purposes and therefore may only be attacked while 
directly participating in the hostilities. 
Civilian objects are those that do not constitute military objectives pursuant 
to the standard set out in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, which provides that 
military objectives are “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.”18 Objects that are not inherently military objectives (such as 
military vehicles and facilities) are only susceptible to attack for such time as they 
qualify as military objectives. Of particular importance in this regard are the criteria 
of “use,” which concerns the present use of a civilian object for a military purpose, 
and “purpose,” which applies to civilian objects that will be used for military 
purposes in the future.19 When not so qualifying, they retain the protection to which 
they are entitled as civilian objects. For the purposes of this article, the term 
“military objective” refers to both targetable persons and objects.20 
The issue of uncertainty permeates the application of these status standards. 
As to persons, the question is whether there is sufficient certainty to conclude an 
individual is a member of the enemy armed forces or an organized armed group. 
For instance, if an individual in the vicinity of an insurgent group’s basecamp is 
observed carrying a weapon and moving towards the basecamp, is the individual a 
member of the group or might he be armed solely for the purpose of personal 
defense against pervasive lawlessness? Moreover, assuming solely for the sake of 
analysis that the continuous combat function is a valid criterion for membership in 
an organized armed group, the person’s function in the group may be somewhat 
unclear. 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.7.3; Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 5, 21–24 (2010). We exclude medical and religious personnel from this conclusion.  
17 ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 33–34. 
18 AP I, supra note 2, art. 52(2); 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 9. On the subject, see also YORAM 
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
102–16 (3rd ed. 2016); A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 11–20 (3rd ed. 2012) (providing 
a general discussion of civilians and civilian objects). 
19 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶¶ 2020, 2022 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann 
eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
20 Id. ¶¶ 1948, 1951. 
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Individuals who are not members of the armed forces or organized armed 
groups are civilians and therefore, as noted, targetable only “for such time” as they 
directly participate in hostilities.21 Uncertainty can exist as to whether the acts in 
which they are engaging qualify as direct participation, as in the case of observing 
someone digging a hole next to a road that might, or might not, be for the purpose 
of implanting an improvised explosive device.22 It can also surface regarding 
whether the person concerned is directly participating in the hostilities at the time 
of attack. The scope of the term “for such time” remains the subject of heated 
debate.23 Nevertheless, there is agreement among IHL practitioners and scholars 
that whatever the appropriate definition thereof, attacks may only occur legally 
while the individual is within that window, thereby raising the question of how to 
treat any uncertainty as to the nature of the person’s activities at the time of the 
proposed attack. 
The certainty inquiry is two-fold vis-à-vis military objectives that are 
objects. First, it is necessary to assess whether the object makes an effective 
contribution to military action due to its nature, location, purpose or use. By way 
of illustration, if infrared sensors or night vision goggles are being used to identify 
a target, how sure is an attacker that the derived image is that of a military instead 
of a civilian vehicle? Or is a house that has been used to store weapons or serve as 
a command and control center a lawful target because it is either still being used at 
the time of attack or will be used in the future? Second, the oft-neglected criterion 
of whether an attack will yield a definite military advantage in these circumstances 
can also be the subject of uncertainty, as with a remote bridge over which some 
enemy troops will pass in the future, when it is unclear that destroying the bridge 
will have any meaningful effect on the enemy’s capability to conduct operations. 
These and other such situations raise the issue of the degree of certainty 
necessary to conclude that the person or object to be attacked constitutes a military 
objective subject to attack at that time. As to persons, Article 50(1) of Additional 
Protocol I provides, “[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person 
shall be considered to be a civilian.”24 Doubt as to the qualification of an object as 
a military objective is dealt with in Article 52(3): “In case of doubt whether an 
object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, 
a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”25 Although 
limited to objects normally dedicated to civilian purposes, it is self-evident that 
                                                 
21 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 15, art. 13(3). 
22 ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 43–45. 
23 See, e.g., Bill Boothby, “And for such time as”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 752–67 (2010); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance 
between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831, 
884–86 (2010); Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, supra note 16, at 34–39. 
24 AP I, supra note 2, art. 50(1). 
25 Id. art. 52(3). 
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doubt can likewise preclude attack on other objects whose status as a military 
objective is uncertain, especially those that might qualify as military objectives on 
the basis of the use or purpose criteria. The articles essentially create a presumption 
of civilian status for both persons and objects when there is uncertainty as to their 
status. 
The two provisions treat the absence of doubt as the threshold for when a 
determination that a person or object is a military objective is lawful. While there 
is a point at which uncertainty estops that conclusion, it is equally the case that 
targets sometimes may be attacked despite the existence of some doubt. To hold 
otherwise would fly in the face of state practice stretching back to the crystallization 
of the principle of distinction. The question remains, therefore, as to how much 
doubt is too much doubt in the face of which to execute an attack. 
Additional Protocol I and the ICRC Commentary thereon lack specificity as 
to the precise level of doubt, or uncertainty, that necessitates making that 
determination. Article 50 was debated by the delegates to the Diplomatic 
Conference who drafted the Protocol.26 Some of them believed the article should 
be redrafted to make the civilian presumption sharper and more understandable for 
the soldier. Others argued for the presumption as drafted.27 Amendments rejected 
by the delegates proposed maintaining the civilian presumption until a person was 
either about to commit a hostile act or until his or her status was otherwise 
established.28 Ultimately, the interpretation of “doubt,” and corresponding level of 
certainty required to determine that a targeted person may be attacked, was left 
unsettled.29 The ICRC Commentary to Article 50 provides a bit of guidance by 
suggesting that the civilian presumption is concerned with “persons who have not 
committed hostile acts, but whose status seems doubtful because of the 
                                                 
26 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶¶ 1918–1920. See generally 
FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR (2007) (providing a series of essays 
documenting the development of the Additional Protocols). 
27 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 
GENEVA 1974–1977, 239 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS]. 
28 An Australian amendment would have stated that the civilian presumption means “in cases where 
doubt arises as to whether a person is a civilian, he shall be presumed to be a civilian until his status 
is otherwise established.” 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 199. Another amendment, 
proposed by Belgium and the United Kingdom, would have maintained the civilian presumption 
until “there are reasonable grounds for supposing that he is about to commit a hostile act.” 3 
OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 198. 
29 The only change made to the civilian presumption was the substitution of the word “presumed” 
for “considered.” This change was not made for clarity or ease of understanding, but instead to 
remove any possible conflict with the prisoner of war presumption in Article 5 of Geneva 
Convention III. See Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 239. See also 
MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 336 n.12 (2d ed. 2013) (“The change does not effect any substantive 
change of meaning. As used in this sentence ‘considered’ means ‘presumed’”). 
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circumstances,”30 and that persons in these circumstances “should be considered to 
be civilians until further information is available.”31 Its recognition that doubt 
should be understood situationally is important, but the Commentary offers no help 
on the requisite degree of doubtfulness. 
Likewise, the delegates’ discussions regarding Article 52 failed to shed 
much light on where the threshold of doubt was to lie with respect to objects.32 As 
with persons, some delegates expressed concern regarding application of the 
presumption in practice during hostilities.33 And while the ICRC Commentary 
labels the civilian presumption for objects “an essential step forward” because it 
prohibits belligerents from “arbitrarily and unilaterally declar[ing] as a military 
objective any civilian object . . . ,”34 it also acknowledged that there would be 
“borderline cases where the responsible authorities could hesitate” to attack.35 
Thus, despite general acceptance of the premise that doubt could preclude attack as 
a matter of law, a lack of granularity persists. 
The unofficial, yet authoritative (in light of the status of its authors as 
participants at the Diplomatic Conference) Bothe, Partsch and Solf commentary 
also failed to resolve the matter. However, it asserts that the aforementioned 
presumptions require that conclusions as to a target’s status as a military objective 
be based on more than speculation.36 It made an analogous conclusion regarding 
the term “definite” in Article 52(2)’s definition of a military objective, explaining 
that the term requires that the military advantage gained from the attack not be 
hypothetical or speculative.37 
                                                 
30 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 1920. 
31 Id.; see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS 56 (1973) [hereinafter ICRC DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (noting that the 
commentary to the 1973 draft stated that the civilian presumption was not “incontrovertible” and 
was “valid only in so far as the appearance and behaviour of the civilians are such as might be 
generally expected of persons claiming to be civilians”). 
32 The Swedish delegation proposed a presumption for objects, stating that since the “delegation 
thought it inevitable that doubt would arise whether certain objectives were civilian or military. It 
would be desirable therefore to stipulate that in case of doubt whether an object was civilian it should 
be presumed to be so . . . .” 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 113. This provision 
corresponded to the civilian presumption for persons in Article 50(1) of AP I. See id. 
33 The Delegates debated the need for an exception allowing for derogation from the civilian 
presumption for objects “in contact zones where the security of the armed forces requires.” 
Supporters of the exception argued that it was necessary to offset the risk the presumption presented 
for soldiers, and that, without the exception, the presumption would not garner respect and 
compliance. 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 331–32. 
34 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2037. The Delegates understood 
this act as creating a “new presumption in the law.” 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 277. 
35 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2037. 
36 BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 29, at 336 (“The practical impact of this rule is to require 
that persons responsible for an attack act honestly on the basis of information available to them at 
the time they take their action and not on the basis of mere speculation”). 
37 Id. at 367. Bothe, Partsch, and Solf came to this conclusion while noting that the Rapporteur could 
not find a substantive difference between the different adjectives debated by the delegates. Id. The 
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These views, combined with the reference to arbitrariness in the ICRC 
Commentary, enunciate a floor below which doubt is no longer an issue because 
the available evidence is too speculative. However, they do not directly bear on 
where the line of unacceptable doubt lies above that floor. That said, there appears 
to be no opposition to the establishment of such a floor. For instance, the DoD 
Manual, which, in our view, incorrectly rejects the customary law status of the two 
provisions, nevertheless confirms that “[a]ttacks . . . may not be directed against 
civilians or civilian objects based on merely hypothetical or speculative 
considerations regarding their possible current status as a military objective.”38 U.S. 
targeting doctrine is in accord.39 
Whatever the requisite level of certainty necessary to render an attack lawful 
under the rules of targeting, it is generally accepted that certainty requirements in 
IHL are to be understood contextually. For instance, although the prodigious 2005 
ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law study contains no rule on doubt, 
it addresses the matter in commentary accompanying the rules on targeting.40 With 
regard to the prohibition on targeting civilians (Rule 6), the study looked to U.K. 
and French reservations at the time of Additional Protocol I ratification to the effect 
that a presumption of civilian status in the face of doubt does not override a 
commander’s responsibility to protect his troops or “preserve their military 
situation.”41 It also quoted from an early edition of the U.S. Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, which stated: “Combatants in the field 
must make an honest determination as to whether a particular civilian is or is not 
subject to deliberate attack based on the person’s behavior, location and attire, and 
other information available at the time.”42  
                                                 
ICRC commentary was also unable to discern any meaningful difference among the debated terms. 
See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2019. 
38 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.4.3.2. 
39 See CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60, JOINT TARGETING A-2–A-3 
(2013) [hereinafter JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60]. In contrast, NATO targeting doctrine recognizes a 
civilian presumption for objects, but not for persons. Although the U.S. recorded several 
reservations to the NATO doctrine, a reservation against the civilian presumption for objects was 
not among them. See N. ATL. TREATY ORG. [NATO], NATO STANDARD AJP-3.9 ALLIED JOINT 
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT TARGETING (ed. A, version 1, Apr. 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/allied-joint-doctrine-for-joint-targeting-ajp-39a 
[https://perma.cc/VNR7-4CF9] [hereinafter NATO AJP-3.9]. 
40 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, at 23–24, 35–36. 
41 Id. at 24 (citing France, Declarations and Reservations Made Upon Ratification of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I, 11 April 2001, § 888 (Fr.); United Kingdom, Declarations and Reservations 
made upon Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 January 1998, § 889 (UK)). 
42 Id. (quoting U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
§ 830 (1995)). A revised Commander’s Handbook was published in August 2017. See U.S. NAVY, 
U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, 
THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 8.2.2 (2017), 
http://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2998109 [https://perma.cc/ZTU6-4XHK] 
[hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
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Based on these and other sources, the ICRC concluded, with respect to 
international armed conflict, that “when there is a situation of doubt, a careful 
assessment has to be made under the conditions and restraints governing a 
particular situation as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an 
attack. One cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious.”43 It 
further suggested that “the same balanced approach . . . seems justified in non-
international armed conflicts.”44 The study took an analogous situational tack with 
regard to objects, adding that it was “also consistent with the requirement to take 
all feasible precautions in attack, in particular the obligation to verify that objects 
to be attacked are military objectives liable to attack and not civilian objects.”45 
This contextual approach to certainty is further reflected in the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, which 
was published in 2009: 
Obviously, the standard of doubt applicable to targeting decision 
. . . must reflect the level of certainty that can reasonably be 
achieved in the circumstances. In practice, this determination will 
have to take into account, inter alia, the intelligence available to the 
decision maker, the urgency of the situation, and the harm likely to 
result to the operating forces or to persons and objects protected 
against direct attack from an erroneous decision.46 
Key States have emphasized the need for case-by-case determinations as to 
the degree of acceptable doubt when determining that a target is a military 
objective. The U.K. Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict (U.K. Manual), for 
example, notes: 
In the practical application of the principle of civilian immunity and 
the rule of doubt, (a) commanders and others responsible for 
planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks necessarily have to 
reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information 
from all sources which is available to them at the relevant time, (b) 
it is only in cases of substantial doubt, after this assessment about 
the status of the individual in question, that the latter should be given 
the benefit of the doubt and treated as a civilian, and (c) the rule of 
doubt does not override the commander’s duty to protect the safety 
of troops under his command or to preserve the military situation.47 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 36. 
46 ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 76. 
47 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.4. For the U.K. statement on which the text is based, see 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Declarations and Reservations Made upon 
Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 January 1998, ¶ h, https://ihl-
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Although suggesting that the proper standard is “substantial doubt,” the force 
protection and military concerns caveats effectively mean that the determination of 
whether the doubt in question is substantial enough to bar attack is in part a product 
of attendant military factors. Similarly, and despite a rejection of the customary 
nature of the aforementioned Additional Protocol I articles on doubt,48 the DoD 
Manual observes, “[i]n assessing whether a person or object that normally does not 
have any military purpose or use is a military objective, commanders and other 
decision-makers must make the decision in good faith based on the information 
available to them in light of the circumstances ruling at the time.”49 
With respect to U.S. practice regarding uncertainty, the concept of Positive 
Identification (PID) has caused a degree of confusion and merits a brief detour. At 
the start of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military adopted 
the standard as a way to operationalize the principle of distinction in ground combat 
situations.50 In this context, PID is defined as a “reasonable certainty that a 
proposed target is a legitimate military target.”51 Although the requirement that an 
attacker have a reasonable degree of certainty is apposite, the word “positive” 
unartfully expresses the principle of distinction’s situational character and suggests 
the existence of a fixed threshold of requisite certainty. This can cause 
misunderstanding as to the attacker’s IHL obligations, which, as explained here, 
are highly contextual.52 Equally problematic is PID’s use in rules of engagement 
(ROE) to effect policy-driven target identification and verification requirements 
that are in excess of IHL’s legal requirements.53 The point is that when associated 
                                                 
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=0A9E0
3F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 [https://perma.cc/NGH4-7TB3]. 
48 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.4.3.2. 
49 Id. The Law of War Manual notes that the good faith criterion has been adopted in other military 
manuals and is supported by case law. In particular, it cited United States v. List, et al. (The Hostage 
Case), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL 1295–96 
(1947–1948).  
50 For a discussion of the origin of Positive Identification and its adoption into ground combat 
operations, see John J. Merriam, Affirmative Target Identification: Operationalizing the Principle 
of Distinction for U.S. Warfighters, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 83, 132–35 (2016). Furthermore, during the 
1990–91 Gulf War, “[a]ttack procedures specified that if the pilot could not positively identify his 
target . . . he could not deliver that weapon.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF 
WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 177 (1992). 
51 See U.S. CFLCC and MNC-I ROE Cards, reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, OPERATIONAL 
LAW HANDBOOK 105–06 (2017). “CFLCC” stands for Combined Forces Land Component 
Commander, whereas “MNC” is the acronym for Multi-National Corps Iraq. 
52 This observation follows the authors’ experience of teaching Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) compliance to U.S. and allied military forces. 
53 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60, supra note 39, at II-29; NATO AJP-3.9, supra note 39, at A-4. Other 
certainty standards may also be adopted for policy reasons. For example, the 2013 standard for 
engaging a target during a counterterrorism strike outside the United States and beyond the active 
battlefield was “near certainty,” both as to the target and “that non-combatants will not be injured 
or killed.” White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in 
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and in Areas of Active Hostilities, May 23, 
2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-
standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism [https://perma.cc/L54B-VY5F]; see also 
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with the principle of distinction, the term PID, the use of which is widespread 
among U.S.-affiliated and -allied forces, does not amount to state practice requiring 
a specific level of certainty in target identification as a matter of law.54 
Groups of experts involved in restatements of customary IHL law projects 
have emphasized the contextual nature of uncertainty. Two such efforts are 
noteworthy in this regard. The HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Air and Missile Warfare maintains the civilian presumption for persons, but not 
specifically for objects normally used for civilian purposes.55 In addressing the 
former, the manual states that the level of doubt required for application of the 
civilian presumption “is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the same 
or similar circumstances to abstain from ordering or executing an attack.”56 
Although it does not apply a presumption of civilian status to objects normally used 
for civilian purposes, the manual states that these objects may only be attacked 
based on reasonable grounds and that reasonable doubt, not just the presence of any 
doubt, would preclude an attack.57 
In the context of cyber operations, the international group of experts that 
produced The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations concluded that the civilian presumption for persons reflects customary 
international law.58 However, the experts also acknowledged that the level of doubt 
required to trigger the presumption is “unsettled,” noting that a cyber-attack in the 
face of the “existence of some doubt” would not establish a breach of the 
prohibition on attacking civilians.59 The experts could reach no consensus as to 
whether a civilian presumption applies to objects.60 They were only able to agree 
that determining whether an object normally used for civilian purpose is a lawful 
military objective requires a careful assessment that is “sufficient to establish that 
there are reasonable grounds” to conclude that the civilian object is being used for 
a military purpose.61 
Some scholars have proposed innovative approaches to certainty. Professor 
Geoffrey Corn has employed the analytical methodology of assessing compliance 
with the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” mandate to 
illuminate the essential role of context in assessing the reasonableness of targeting 
                                                 
Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International 
Law, 52 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 107–08 (2013). 
54 Merriam, supra note 50, at 132. 
55 AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 116–19. 
56 Id. at 90. 
57 Id. at 119. 
58 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 424. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 448–49. 
61 Id. at 449. 
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decisions.62 Corn cites well-developed tests for Fourth Amendment reasonableness, 
and explains how those tests demand differing quanta of information to support 
different types of Fourth Amendment intrusions.63 Drawing on this methodology 
for evaluating compliance with the reasonableness touchstone, he proposes a 
“quantum of information framework” for targeting, in which the extent of 
information needed to support a “reasonable” attack judgment varies depending on 
how the operational context influences the risk of targeting mistakes.64 In Fourth 
Amendment analysis, as the level of government intrusion or intrusion 
on individual interest increases, the corresponding information threshold also rises. 
Corn suggests an analogous system for targeting, replacing the level of government 
intrusion or loss of individual interest with a consideration of the consequences of 
an erroneous targeting decision.65 
Two aspects of context are central to his approach: the nature of a potential 
target and the operational context in which the attack decision is made. 
Accordingly, a low threshold is required for “presumptive enemy targets” such as 
military personnel and equipment, especially during a military operation against a 
“conventional” force operating pursuant to established doctrine.66 The required 
quantum of information becomes progressively higher for objects normally used 
for civilian purposes and for civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, especially 
in operational contexts that are substantially removed from a “conventional” 
hostilities situation that would justify, for example, unobserved indirect fires based 
on decision templates or counter-battery radars. For these three target categories, 
Corn suggests certainty thresholds analogous to the established Fourth Amendment 
“tiers” of reasonableness: reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and 
preponderance, respectively.67 Additionally, he proposes a standard of information 
analogous to clear and convincing proof for attacks on unconventional targets 
outside of an area of active hostilities.68 
Professor Adil Haque has recommended what he labels “deontological 
targeting.”69 Haque sets the certainty floor for making a determination that a target 
qualifies as a military objective at “reasonable belief.” This threshold is met when 
an attacker is “reasonably convinced that the individual is a combatant”70 and their 
belief is supported by decisive evidence, meaning that (a) the evidence that the 
person is a lawful target clearly outweighs the evidence that the person is a 
                                                 
62 Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information 
Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
437, 441–42 (2012). 
63 Id. at 466–76. 
64 Id. at 476–77.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 480–81. 
67 Id. at 484–89. 
68 Id. at 490–94. 
69 Adil Haque, Killing in the Fog of War, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 67 (2012). 
70 Id. at 91. Haque’s approach to proportionality appears limited to persons. The article does not 
contain a companion approach regarding objects. 
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protected person; and (b) the evidence that the person is a lawful target has 
sufficient weight or reliability to warrant forming any belief, rather than suspending 
judgment.71  
Above this “reasonable belief” threshold, the required level of certainty 
reflects the humanitarian risk of mistakenly attacking civilians and varies with the 
military risk of mistakenly sparing lawful targets. For example, a reasonable belief 
that a person is an insurgent leader might be sufficient to justify attacking that 
person, assuming that it is impossible or infeasible to wait and gather more 
definitive information. On the other hand, near-certainty that a person is a member 
of an armed group who exclusively performs minor administrative functions might 
be required to support an attack on that person. Interestingly, Haque argues that the 
required level of certainty increases quite rapidly as the potential military value of 
the suspected target decreases, based on the philosophical principle that 
mistakenly killing an innocent person is morally worse than mistakenly sparing a 
dangerous person who may kill an innocent person himself—the “moral asymmetry 
between killing and letting die.”72 Accordingly, Haque’s methodology results in 
increasingly higher certainty thresholds in relation to the consequences of 
incorrectly determining that a person is a combatant instead of a civilian.73 
We take a somewhat different tack, one that focuses squarely on the 
balancing of military necessity and humanitarian considerations that suffuses IHL. 
In our view, that dynamic provides greater fidelity to the extant law and better 
reflects the contextual approach articulated by states and key IHL actors such as the 
ICRC than, for instance, either Corn’s tiered system or Haque’s infusion of the law 
with concepts drawn from extra-legal disciplines.  
By our approach, the greater the value of a target, the more uncertainty may 
be countenanced in an attack, and vice versa. That such a comparative assessment 
is appropriate in IHL is evidenced by the law’s endorsement of a similar 
comparative approach in the context of proportionality, which is discussed below. 
There, a great deal of expected civilian harm may be lawful when the anticipated 
military advantage is very high, while even a small degree of expected civilian harm 
can render an attack unlawful if the military advantage anticipated to result from 
the attack is low. In other words, military necessity (military advantage) and 
                                                 
71 ADIL AHMAD HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY AT WAR 119–20 (2017). The approach set forth in the 
book slightly raises the threshold that he originally articulated in his article. 
72 Haque, Killing in the Fog of War, supra note 69, at 84. 
73 Id. at 102–03. By way of example, if a soldier observes three armed men that do not pose an 
immediate threat to the soldier, any of his comrades, or any civilians, the soldier should only attack 
these men if he is reasonably convinced (Haque’s highest level of certainty) that the armed men are 
insurgents. If the soldier is reasonably confident (Haque’s second highest level of certainty) that the 
armed men are about to attack either a comparable number of civilians or fellow soldiers, the soldier 
can attack them. If the soldier reasonably believes (Haque’s minimum level of certainty) that the 
three armed men are going to attack a “substantially greater number of soldiers or civilians,” then 
the soldier can attack.  
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humanitarian considerations (collateral damage) exist in relation to each other, and 
they do so on a case-by-case basis. 
Analogously, the risk posed by uncertainty when identifying a target is that 
the target will be misidentified as a valid military objective and the attack 
accordingly will harm persons or objects protected by IHL. This risk reflects the 
humanitarian concern that is present in the aforementioned balancing. But the 
military advantage anticipated to accrue if the target is attacked must also be 
considered. The objective is to determine when the risk of harm to protected 
persons or objects should the target be misidentified as a military objective is 
warranted relative to the anticipated value of the target; at that point, the prospective 
attack becomes lawful.  
This relationship can be expressed as follows: 
VDE ∙ PDE > VUH ∙ PUH 
VDE represents the value of the desired effect, PDE is the probability of achieving 
the desired effect, VUH represents the value to be attributed to unintended harm 
caused to civilians or civilian objects, and PUH is the probability of such harm 
occurring.  
Focusing on the value of the desired effect, represented by VDE, is consistent 
with effects-based targeting analysis,74 meaning that it is the negative effect on 
enemy operations, or the positive effect on the attacker’s own operations, that 
factors into the analysis, not any set value of a target based on its nature or other 
fixed feature. For instance, an attack that disrupts enemy command and control 
communications is less valuable when back-up systems are available than when 
there is no redundancy. Similarly, the value of the effect of an attack on forces 
retreating in disarray will usually be less than that which results from attacking 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against you at the time. 
This is then discounted by the degree of uncertainty as to achieving the 
desired effect, a value represented by PDE. The value can be further understood as: 
PDE = PTI ∙ PKD ∙ NKD 
PTI is the probability of accurate target identification, PKD is the probability that the 
attack will cause the desired death (kill) or damage to the target, and NKD is the 
degree of nexus between the desired death or damage to the target and the overall 
desired effect from the attack.  
The first component of the aforementioned equation, PTI, acknowledges the 
fact that targets are sometimes misidentified. This risk should form part of the 
likelihood of achieving the desired effect. To take a simple example, one Haque 
also applied in setting forth his approach, consider the case of an insurgent 
                                                 
74 See JOINT PUBLICATION, supra note 39, at I-7. 
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commander thought to be in a particular building. The question is whether the 
commander is still there. A real-time video feed from a remotely piloted aircraft 
that shows the commander entering a building will likely engender greater certainty 
than information that is several days old from a human intelligence source to the 
effect that the commander will be in the building at the planned time of attack. 
Similarly, the availability of multiple sources of intelligence verifying the 
commander is probably present will enhance the extent of certainty. 
A related consideration is the degree of certainty that the attack will kill or 
damage the target, represented by PKD in the formula. Consider the insurgent in the 
previous example. Not only must any uncertainty that the individual is in the 
targeted building be considered, but so too must the probability that an attack on 
the building will kill him or her. Likelihood of death can be greater, for instance, if 
the target is in certain parts of the building, such as the top floors or near exterior 
walls. Additionally, buildings constructed with particular materials such as wood 
are more likely to collapse and thereby kill the individual than buildings made of 
other materials, like concrete. Furthermore, weapons differ in precision capability, 
and operate differently in differing environments, thereby affecting the likelihood 
that the intended injury or damage will manifest. The point is that an attack often 
has less than a 100% chance of causing the death or damage that is intended to 
result in the desired effect.  
The certainty of achieving the desired effect is also influenced by the causal 
relationship between the death or damage and the desired effect.75 In our example, 
the desired effect is not to kill the insurgent commander. Rather, it may be, for 
example, to complicate enemy command-and-control by decapitating the enemy 
force. With some insurgent groups, it might be clear that the death of their leader 
will have this effect on enemy operations, whereas in others a new and effective 
leader will probably be found quickly. In the former case, the likelihood of 
achieving the desired effect is higher than in the latter. Of course, such cases are 
always context dependent. For example, although it may be anticipated that a 
targeted leader will be replaced quickly, if the effect sought is merely to disrupt 
enemy command-and-control for a short period while particular friendly operations 
are launched, the certainty of achieving the desired effect would be high. 
As noted earlier, it must be emphasized that these formulae are not to be 
applied mechanistically. After all, it is impossible to mathematically express the 
value of the effect of an attack, as it also is to precisely calculate the certainty of 
achieving that effect. Instead, the formula, like all of those set forth below, is meant 
only as a cognitive framework reflecting how uncertainty factors into the 
deliberative targeting process. Nevertheless, although effect and the degree of 
certainty that the effect will be achieved are intangibles incapable of surgical 
quantification, competent commanders and other decision makers generally have a 
                                                 
75 Consideration of the causational relationship between the death and destruction achieved and the 
desired effect operationalizes the causal element imparted into proportionality by the modifying 
term “direct.” See infra text accompanying notes 77–78. 
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sense of how important a target is operationally in the circumstances and how likely 
it is that an operation will be successful.  
The resulting assessment as to the value and likelihood of achieving the 
effect sought—in other words, the military necessity of the attack—is then 
examined in light of humanitarian considerations, that is, the risk of unintended 
harm to protected persons or objects, expressed as VUH ∙ PUH. VUH represents the 
value to be attributed to unintended harm caused to civilians, civilian objects and 
other protected persons or objects in the event of attack following target 
misidentification. This value is considered in light of the likelihood that the 
unintended harm will occur, or PUH, which can be further unpacked as:  
PUH = PTM ∙ PKD 
PTM denotes the likelihood of the target being misidentified as a military objective 
when it is in fact a protected person or object. It is the reverse side of PTI, the 
probability that a target is correctly identified, which was previously factored into 
the effects analysis.76 As with determining likely effects, PKD reflects the fact that 
the strike may not cause the death or damage intended. In the case of individuals, 
this will usually be a constant on both sides of the equation; individuals are equally 
susceptible to injury or death regardless of their status as targetable individuals or 
civilians. However, for strikes against objects, the certainty of achieving the 
damage may differ. For instance, consider a weaponeering decision based on a 
mistaken assessment that a structure is a hardened military facility. In fact, it is a 
civilian structure. If hardened, the nature of the target will lower the likelihood of 
damage, whereas the likelihood of causing damage to an unhardened civilian 
structure will be greater.  
To illustrate the full analysis, consider the earlier scenario involving 
command and control. If disrupting enemy command and control during ongoing 
hostilities is highly valuable, an attack may be merited in the face of a significant 
likelihood of misidentification and high value of the person or object so 
misidentified. But should the same degree of uncertainty exist as to a lower level 
fighter, an attack might not be justified. In the latter case, this is because 
humanitarian value (the value of the misidentified person or object and the 
likelihood of causing that harm) outweighs the positive impact that would result 
from removing the individual from the battlefield.  
III. The Rule of Proportionality 
The customary international law rule of proportionality that has been 
codified for state parties in Articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I prohibits an 
“attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
                                                 
76 In a hypothetical case in which (% of ID) on the left side of the equation is 100%, the likelihood 
of misidentification would be zero and the (V of MT) would therefore be irrelevant. The key issue 
would accordingly be proportionality, which is discussed below. 
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civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”77 It 
is the clearest example of the fundamental function of IHL, which is to effect a 
working relationship between military necessity and humanitarian considerations.78 
Uncertainty arises as a proportionality issue in two regards. First, there is 
the matter of how uncertainty as to the occurrence and extent of incidental injury 
to civilians or collateral damage to civilian objects (referred to collectively as 
“collateral damage” in this article) should factor into the proportionality 
calculation. Second, and analogously, there is the matter of how doubt that the 
military advantage will be achieved (and if it is, the degree to which it is achieved) 
should affect the proportionality determination. 
The prospect of codifying the rule of proportionality sparked debate among 
the delegates to the Diplomatic Conference at which the Additional Protocols were 
drafted between 1974 and 1977.79 Discussion centered on the ICRC’s draft text for 
the rule of proportionality. That text articulated the rule of proportionality as a 
prohibition against attacks that “may be expected to entail incidental losses among 
the civilian population and cause the destruction of civilian objects to an extent 
disproportionate to the direct and substantial military advantage anticipated.”80 
Some of the delegates expressed concern about the subjective and 
ambiguous nature of the rule on the basis that it necessitated a comparison between 
incommensurate values.81 For them, any protection afforded to civilians under the 
proposed articles could easily be overcome on the basis of the purported military 
advantage of an attack.82 These were fair concerns, for subjectivity and ambiguity 
were, and remain, the key obstacles to definitive application of the rule on the 
battlefield. Uncertainty as to the likelihood of collateral damage and military 
                                                 
77 AP I, supra note 2, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). For the purposes of this article, incidental 
loss of life, injury, and damage to persons and objects that occur during an attack will be referred to 
as “collateral damage.” On proportionality generally, see DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 149–62. See 
also ROGERS, supra note 18, at 21–26. 
78 See Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportion and the “Reasonable Military Commander”: 
Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 299, 308 
(2015); see also Schmitt, supra note 10, at 837. 
79 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2204. 
80 ICRC DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 57. Two draft articles addressed 
proportionality: Draft Article 46(3)(b), which is quoted above, and Draft Article 50(b). Draft Article 
46 ultimately became AP I, Article 51, while Draft Article 50 became AP I, Article 57. See 3 
OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at xiv. Draft Article 50 directed those responsible for an attack 
to, “if possible, cancel or suspend it [the attack] if . . . incidental losses in civilian lives and damage 
to civilian objects would be disproportionate to the direct and substantial advantage anticipated.” 
ICRC DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 64. The delegates decided that they would 
consolidate the debate on the proportionality elements of Draft Articles 46 and 50, and, after finding 
consensus on a single text, either reproduce this text in both articles, or use a cross-reference between 
articles. See 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 330–31. 
81 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 49. 
82 Id. at 182. 
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advantage further exacerbates the abstruseness of proportionality calculations, 
specifically the process of determining the value to be attributed to both prongs of 
the analysis. 
The ICRC Commentary acknowledged that the rule of proportionality 
“allows for a fairly broad margin of judgment.”83 In response to this reality, the 
ICRC appropriately harkened back to the need to seek balance between military 
necessity and humanitarian concerns when applying principles and rules of IHL: 
The ICRC constantly had to bear in mind the fact that the ideal was 
complete elimination, in all circumstances, of losses among the 
civilian population. But to formulate that ideal in terms of an 
impracticable rule would not promote either the credibility or the 
effectiveness of humanitarian law.84 
That the rule of proportionality necessitates a case-by-case analysis is apparent. As 
recognized in the Commentary, “the disproportion between losses and damages 
caused and the military advantages anticipated raises a delicate problem; in some 
situations there will be no room for doubt, while in other situations there may be 
reason for hesitation.”85 Consequently, the treatment of uncertainty with respect to 
the potential for collateral damage and the likelihood of achieving the desired 
military advantage occupy center stage when performing proportionality 
calculations for a specific attack. 
The issue of certainty was not lost on the delegates to the Diplomatic 
Conference. This is clear from the debate over, and textual changes made during 
the drafting of, the proportionality rule.86 As to collateral damage, the delegates 
adopted the phrase “expected to cause” in lieu of “create a risk of.”87 Although the 
Rapporteur could not explain the substantive difference between the two options,88 
the former would appear to require a greater degree of certainty. The Commentary 
also highlighted the role of uncertainty vis-a-vis collateral damage by including a 
list of relevant factors that “together must be taken into consideration whenever an 
attack could hit incidentally civilian persons and objects.”89 
The danger incurred by the civilian population and civilian objects 
depends on various factors: their location (possibly within or in the 
                                                 
83 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2210. 
84 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 183; see also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2206. 
85 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 1979. 
86 Id. ¶ 2204. 
87 The origin of this choice is not clear. The phrase “create a risk” does not appear in the relevant 
amendments submitted by the delegates. See 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 200–06, 227–
31. The authors assume that this phrase was a product of negotiations within Committee III’s 
Working Group. See 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 353. 
88 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 353. 
89 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2213 (emphasis added). 
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vicinity of a military objective), the terrain (landslides, floods etc.), 
accuracy of the weapons used (greater or lesser dispersion, 
depending on the trajectory, the range, the ammunition used etc.), 
weather conditions (visibility, wind etc.), the specific nature of the 
military objectives concerned (ammunition depots, fuel reservoirs, 
main roads of military importance at or in the vicinity of inhabited 
areas etc.), and the technical skill of the combatants (random 
dropping of bombs when unable to hit the intended target).90 
Similarly, “concrete and direct military advantage” replaced “direct and 
substantial military advantage” during the proceedings,91 the new phrase being 
more demanding in terms of certainty. The ICRC Commentary to Article 57 points 
out that “the expression ‘concrete and direct’ was intended to show that the 
advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages 
which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term 
should be disregarded.”92 
 The unavoidable uncertainty in making highly contextual proportionality 
determinations, and therefore the relevance of certainty, was likewise recognized 
in the Bothe, Partsch and Solf commentary. That commentary describes the 
proportionality analysis as a decision process that seeks to balance “the foreseeable 
extent of incidental or collateral civilian casualties or damage” and “the relative 
importance of the military objective as a target.”93 
Although it failed to expound on the extent to which collateral damage must 
be foreseeable to factor into a proportionality analysis, the commentary somewhat 
clarified the scope of what qualifies as an anticipated military advantage. It defines 
the term “concrete” in Article 57 as meaning “specific, not general; perceptible to 
the senses,” equating it to the term “definite” as used to describe military advantage 
in Article 52.94 The commentary also described the term “direct” as meaning 
“‘without intervening condition of agency.’”95 Because of this introduction of an 
element of causality, their commentary treats the concept of military advantage 
                                                 
90 Id. ¶ 2212. 
91 As with the phrase “create a risk” discussed in supra note 87, the origin of this word choice is not 
clear. And, as with “create a risk,” the phrase “concrete and direct” does not appear in any of the 
relevant amendments submitted by the delegates. See 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 200–
06, 227–31. The authors assume that this phrase was a product of negotiations within Committee 
III’s Working Group. As the Rapporteur noted, the text for the rule of proportionality “was found 
ultimately to be acceptable when . . . phrased in terms of ‘losses excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.’” 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 285 (emphasis 
added). 
92 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2209. 
93 BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 29, at 351 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 407; see also U.K. MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.33.3. 
95 BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 29, at 407. 
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within proportionality as more restrictive than it is vis-a-vis defining a military 
objective.96 
The Bothe, Partsch and Solf commentary further concludes that an 
anticipated concrete and direct military advantage cannot be “a remote advantage 
to be gained at some unknown time in the future” and that such a remote advantage 
“would not be a proper consideration to weigh against civilian losses.”97 In other 
words, the causal nexus must be discernible and not speculative. Thus, the 
commentary acknowledges that uncertainty plays a role in the proportionality 
analysis, that there is a point at which the likelihood of collateral damage or military 
advantage is too low to be considered, and that above that threshold, uncertainty is 
situational. 
In its Customary International Humanitarian Law study, the ICRC captured 
the rule of proportionality in three rules. Rule 14 sets forth the basic rule,98 Rule 18 
mandates an assessment of compliance with the rule in an attack,99 and Rule 19 
requires the attack to be suspended or cancelled should it become “apparent” that 
the rule of proportionality is likely to be violated.100 Although the accompanying 
commentary fails to directly address the degree of certainty necessary for 
qualification as expected collateral damage or anticipated military advantage, the 
study identifies a number of relevant state declarations. For instance, it points to 
the Additional Protocol I ratification statements of Australia and New Zealand, 
which interpreted “concrete and direct military advantage” as meaning a “bona fide 
expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution” to 
the overall military objective.101 
Military manuals also acknowledge that the issue of certainty bears on the 
proportionality analysis. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4: Law of 
Armed Conflict acknowledges this point when it describes proportionality as 
requiring “a commander to weigh the military value arising from the success of the 
operation against the possible harmful effects to protected populations and 
                                                 
96 Id. See also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2218; International 
Law Association Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st Century, The Conduct of 
Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, 93 INT’L L. 
STUD. 322, 365 (2017). 
97 BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 29, at 407. 
98 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 14. 
99 Id. r. 18. 
100 Id. r. 19. 
101 Id. at 50 (citing Australia, Declarations and Reservations Made Upon Ratification of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I, ¶ 5 (June 24, 1991), available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&document 
Id=10312B4E9047086EC1256402003FB253 [https://perma.cc/L2BN-65SR]; New Zealand, 
Declarations and Reservations Made Upon Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, ¶ 3, (Feb. 
8, 1988)) (emphasis added). See also CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 415 (“A concrete and 
direct military advantage exists if the commander has an honest and reasonable expectation that the 
attack will make a relevant contribution to the success of the overall operation.”). 
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objects.”102 In addressing what qualifies as expected collateral damage, the U.K. 
Manual refers to “foreseeable effects,” a phrase that confirms that speculative harm 
does not suffice. But it equally recognizes that foreseeability includes an element 
of uncertainty. Using the example of an attack on a military fuel depot located near 
a populated area, the U.K. Manual states that if the attack creates “the foreseeable 
risk” of excessive incidental loss, it would violate the rule of proportionality.103 
Risk by definition implies causal uncertainty. As to military advantage, that manual 
notes:  
“Concrete and direct” means that the advantage to be gained is 
identifiable and quantifiable and one that flows directly from the 
attack, not some pious hope that it might improve the military 
situation in the long term. In this sense, it is like the term “definite” 
used in the definition of military objects.104 
When discussing the collateral damage to be considered in the 
proportionality analysis, the DoD Manual expressly states that “remote” harm is 
too attenuated for inclusion in proportionality calculations because of the 
“difficulty of accurately predicting the myriad of remote harms from [an] attack.”105 
Instead, it concludes that “immediate or direct harms foreseeably resulting from 
[an] attack” are appropriate for consideration in the proportionality analysis 
because that is what “[t]he expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and 
damage to civilian objects is generally understood to mean.”106 Although the 
authors are of the view that foreseeable indirect harm should be included in the 
proportionality analysis, the Department of Defense’s ground for rejecting this 
view is based on uncertainty, thereby confirming its relevance. 
With respect to certainty in the military advantage context, the manual is 
clear––it “may not be merely hypothetical or speculative” and there must be a 
“good faith expectation that [an] attack will make a relevant proportional 
contribution” to the overall military advantage gained from the attack as a whole.107 
As with all of the guidance above, the manual leaves unresolved the question of 
                                                 
102 Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4 (ADDP 06.4): Law of 
Armed Conflict, at 5-4, ¶ 5.9 (2006), 
http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP06.4-
LawofArmedConflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3TW-4R6A]. Several other nations offer similar 
descriptions in their military manuals. See, e.g., CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 204; 
Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004 (Edición 
Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, ¶ 
2-5 2 November 2007 (Sp.). 
103 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.33.4 (emphasis added). 
104 Id. ¶ 5.33.3. 
105 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.12.1.3. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. §§ 5.12.2–.2.1. 
172 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
how certain the collateral damage or incidental injury must be to be considered in 
the proportionality analysis. 
In terms of expert, albeit unofficial, manuals, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 failed 
to resolve the issue of uncertainty when doing proportionality calculations. The 
experts involved in the project agreed, however, that “[e]xpectation and 
anticipation do not require absolute certainty of occurrence. By the same token, the 
mere possibility of occurrence does not suffice to attribute expectation or 
anticipation to those planning, approving, or executing a cyber attack.”108 Beyond 
this consensus, they were divided. 
There was a discussion among the International Group of Experts over 
whether and to what extent uncertainty as to collateral damage affects application 
of the rule of proportionality. The issue is of particular relevance in the context of 
cyber attacks in that it is sometimes quite difficult to reliably determine likely 
collateral damage in advance. A minority of the Experts took the position that the 
lower the probability of collateral damage, the less the military advantage needed 
to justify the operation. The majority of Experts rejected this approach on the basis 
that once collateral damage is expected, it must be calculated into the 
proportionality analysis as such; it is not appropriate to consider the degree of 
certainty as to possible collateral damage. The attacker either reasonably expects it 
or the possibility of collateral damage is merely speculative, in which case it would 
not be considered in assessing proportionality.109 
The Harvard Manual experts took a middle ground, concluding that the 
terms “expected” and “anticipated” meant “probable.”110 They also adopted a 
certainty threshold of “more likely than not” as determined by a “good-faith 
assessment by the commander.”111 
Proportionality-related text of Articles 51 and 57, the commentary thereto, 
efforts to operationalize the rule in official military manuals, and learned treatment 
by groups of experts, taken together, lead to the conclusion that characterizing 
expected harm as collateral damage or anticipated effect as military advantage 
requires, at a minimum, a certainty of occurrence beyond mere speculation. 
Collateral damage must be characterized by a degree of predictability and an 
element of causal nexus that is not highly attenuated. Likewise, for an anticipated 
military advantage to be “concrete and direct,” the anticipated effect factoring into 
the proportionality analysis must be perceptible and reflect a causal nexus between 
it and the attack on the target. 
Unfortunately, these conclusions only establish a floor for certainty as to 
both collateral damage and military advantage, in much the same way that 
qualification of a possible target as a military objective is subject to a minimum 
                                                 
108 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 475.  
109 Id. 
110 AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 97. 
111 Id. 
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degree of certainty. Yet, the task at hand is to ascertain how uncertainty as to 
expected collateral damage and anticipated concrete and direct military advantage 
affects the excessiveness assessment in practice. This poses the challenge of 
determining the value to be attributed to both. 
We begin by setting forth the cognitive framework for valuation of 
collateral damage. 
Σ [VCIV ∙ PCD] 
Σ, denoting sum, reflects the fact that all collateral damage concerns must be 
considered in an attack. VCIV is the value to be attributed to each civilian or civilian 
object that could be harmed, and PCD denotes the probability of collateral damage 
to each of them. It may be necessary to evaluate them separately. For instance, the 
likelihood of an explosion harming a civilian inside a building may differ 
significantly from that of causing damage to the building. 
Of course, it is impossible to precisely meter the value to be ascribed to 
civilians and civilian objects (or parts thereof) that might incidentally be harmed 
during an attack. To illustrate, while the value of five civilians generally can be said 
to be less than, say, ten civilians, how should issues like age or role in providing 
essential civilian services for the population (e.g., health care) affect the valuation 
of the harm? Similarly, what is the relative harm value, for example, of damage to 
a single building that performs a key function for the civilian population, like an 
electrical sub-station, and damage to multiple empty warehouses?  
All that is really clear, based on the plain text of the rule, is that only 
“incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects”112 
are considered in proportionality assessments. Mere inconvenience and other 
intangible forms of harm do not qualify as collateral damage for the purpose of the 
rule unless they in turn cause qualifying consequences, as in the case of a denial of 
service cyber-attack on a dual purpose electrical grid during the dead of winter that 
will foreseeably result in individuals freezing to death.113 Ultimately, the 
determination of the value to be attributed to collateral damage, VCIV, is to be made 
on the basis of reasonable expectations “in light of reliable information available at 
the time,”114 that is, the value that a reasonable attacker in the same or similar 
circumstances would accord it. The vagueness inherent in the standard renders it 
difficult to apply with precision, but this standard is nevertheless widely accepted 
by practitioners and others assessing proportionality. 
This value is then considered in light of the likelihood of the collateral 
damage manifesting, PCD. In this assessment, all civilian harm is “foreseeable” 
collateral damage for the purposes of the proportionality calculation, excluding, of 
                                                 
112 AP I, supra note 2, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
113 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 415–20. 
114 AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 97. 
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course, that which is purely speculative. The relevant harm includes not only that 
directly caused by the attack, as with damage or injury from the blast effects of a 
weapon, but also foreseeable indirect effects, which are sometimes labeled 
reverberating or knock-on effects.115 
Obviously, the expected likelihood of collateral damage occurring will vary 
during each attack based on factors such as the weapon used, location of persons 
relative to the blast, the materials of which affected facilities are composed, weapon 
delivery tactics, the pattern of life in the target area at the time of proposed attack, 
and the reliability of information regarding the target area. Therefore, we adopt the 
minority position taken by the Tallinn Manual experts: the degree of certainty that 
qualifying harm will occur affects the value of the collateral damage factored into 
the proportionality calculation.116 
In our estimation, it would run counter to the balancing of military necessity 
and humanitarian considerations to hold otherwise. On the one hand, including 
harm that is unlikely, albeit not speculative, without considering the probability of 
that harm manifesting would unduly constrain the military necessity of conducting 
an attack and therefore skew the balancing. Yet, to ignore such harm altogether 
because it does not reach an objective threshold of certainty, wherever that 
threshold might lie, would be to discount the humanitarian mandate by disregarding 
actual risk to civilians and civilian objects. 
The approach also reflects reality. In practice, commanders and others 
involved in planning, deciding on, or executing attacks consider probability when 
assessing potential collateral damage. The widely used collateral damage estimate 
methodology, for example, although not strictly a tool for assessing proportionality, 
takes into account such factors as the weapon used, distance from blast, population 
density and structural integrity in determining the level at which an attack posing 
the risk of collateral damage must be approved.117 These and other factors decrease 
or increase the likelihood of harm occurring and are therefore considered when 
arriving at the collateral damage estimate. 
Because collateral damage caused by an individual attack can manifest with 
regard to multiple civilians and civilian objects, and the certainty attendant to each 
can differ based on contextual factors, it may be necessary when assessing the 
proportionality of a single attack to do multiple collateral damage calculations. The 
symbol Σ, which denotes the sum of those assessments, takes this reality into 
                                                 
115 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 472; see also JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60, supra note 
39, at II-35 to -36. 
116 See supra text accompanying note 89. 
117 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3160.01, NO-STRIKE AND THE 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY, D-A-1 to D-A-3 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/drone_dod_3160_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9QL-
XJGQ]. The current version of CJCSI 3160.01 is marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) and subject 
to limited distribution. This cited version was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request from the ACLU. 
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account. Accordingly, a separate assessment must be made for each type of harm 
and with respect to any differing degree of uncertainty as to the harm likely to be 
caused in that category. They are added together to form the final assessment of the 
value to be attributed to the expected collateral damage. Again, it is important to 
note that the formula is meant to reflect a cognitive framework, not an arithmetical 
exercise. It merely notes that in doing the proportionality calculation, the estimate 
of total collateral damage must account for the likelihood of its occurrence. 
We take a similar approach with respect to the valuation of military 
advantage, that is, VDE ∙ PDE. As with qualification as a military objective, the 
notation VDE represents the valuation of the desired effect sought. The discussion 
of desired effect applicable in the context of military objectives applies mutatis 
mutandis here. To arrive at the final value to be attributed to military advantage, it 
is necessary to consider the value of the desired effect in light of the degree of 
certainty of that effect being achieved, represented by PDE in the formula. This 
likelihood is determined in the same manner as the question of qualification as a 
military objective. 
Once both the expected collateral damage and anticipated concrete and 
direct military advantage have been assessed in light of their respective uncertainty, 
the proportionality examination concludes with a determination of whether the 
former is “excessive” relative to the latter. This determination is not based upon a 
strict balancing test in the sense of asking whether the value assessed for one side 
of the equation outweighs, even slightly, the other; rather, expected collateral 
damage only bars attack once it rises to the “excessive” threshold. This threshold 
is based upon what the notional reasonable attacker in the same or similar 
circumstances would conclude.118 We agree with the experts who drafted the 
Harvard Manual that excessiveness is characterized by a situation in which “there 
is a significant imbalance between the military advantage anticipated, on the one 
hand, and the expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects, on the 
other.”119 
Expressed in its entirety, the cognitive framework for determining that an 
attack will violate the rule of proportionality is as follows: 
Σ [VCIV ∙ PCD] excessive relative to [VDE ∙ PDE]120 
                                                 
118 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); see also Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational 
Targeting: Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 337, 366 (2012). 
119 AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 98; NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 344, 360 (2008). 
120 Expected sum of [(value of the civilians or civilian objects) considered in light of (probability 
of collateral damage occurring to them)] is excessive relative to (value of the desired effect) 
considered in light of (probability of achieving that effect).  
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We note that this was, in relevant part, the approach adopted by the prosecution in 
the Gotovina case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. In its brief,121 which cited to the ICRC Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols, the prosecution noted: 
Under the rules of proportionality, even a reasonable perception that 
hitting a target will offer a “concrete and direct” military advantage does 
not justify targeting the object where the chances of actually hitting the 
target are minimal to none, while the chances of hitting civilian objects 
are guaranteed. Weighing up whether “collateral damage or incidental 
injury will be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct advantage 
anticipated from the attack” must take into account the accuracy of the 
chosen means. In this way, the “concrete and direct advantage 
anticipated” is not the value of the target wholly in the abstract but rather 
its abstract value relative to the likelihood of in fact neutralizing or 
destroying the object. Similarly, the weight of the collateral damage on 
the other side of the equation is relative to its certainty or likelihood. 
The “danger” incurred by the civilian population is thus dependent on 
such factors as the “accuracy of the weapons used (greater or lesser 
dispersion, depending on the trajectory, the range, the ammunition used 
etc.)” and “technical skill of the combatants (random dropping of bombs 
when unable to hit the intended target).”122 
 Clearly, conducting a proportionality analysis involves more than simply 
assessing relative values of expected collateral damage and anticipated military 
advantage. It necessitates factoring in the likelihood that those values will manifest. 
Only once that has occurred does consideration of whether an attack is excessive 
accurately reflect the sought-after balancing of military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations.  
IV. The Requirement to Take Active Precautions 
Even when an attack against a lawful military objective conforms to the rule 
of proportionality, the attacker must take feasible measures to limit harm to 
civilians and civilian objects. These measures, known as “active precautions,” are 
set forth in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I and are generally considered to 
reflect customary international law.123 Active precautions must be distinguished 
from passive precautions, which obligate a defender, pursuant to Article 58 of 
                                                 
121 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Prosecution’s Public Redacted 
Public Trial Brief, ¶ 549 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2010). 
122 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2212. 
123 See 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, rr. 15–21; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 476–87; 
AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 141–48. But see DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 
5.11.7.1 (stating that the U.S. does not view Article 57(3) as customary international law). 
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Additional Protocol I and customary law, to take steps to protect the civilian 
population from the harmful effects of an attack.124 
Article 57 provides:  
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken 
to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. 
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives 
to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects and are not subject to special protection but 
are military objectives within the meaning of 
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited 
by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them; 
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, 
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects; 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or 
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated; 
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes 
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject 
to special protection or that the attack may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
                                                 
124 See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2241; 1 CIHL STUDY, 
supra note 2, r. 22; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.14. As suggested by the 
terms active and passive, while the precautions prescribed by these two articles have inherently 
different natures, they share a commonality of uncertainty. Article 58 of AP I requires that a 
belligerent “shall, to the maximum extent feasible” take precautions to protect civilians and civilian 
objects under their control. AP I, supra note 2, art. 58. Further, both active and passive precautions 
coalesce around the same two key points: uncertainty regarding when a precaution is required and 
uncertainty regarding whether or not a precaution is “feasible.” 
178 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated; 
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which 
may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do 
not permit. 
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for 
obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected 
shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least 
danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.125 
Both general and specific obligations reside in the article. Article 57(1) sets 
forth the broad “constant care” obligation. This duty was relatively novel in 1977 
when Additional Protocol I was adopted. Indeed, in documents submitted to the 
Conference of Government Experts in 1971,126 the ICRC noted that IHL lacked an 
express requirement for the taking of “general precautions” to protect the civilian 
population from the negative effects of military operations.127 The closest 
equivalent was the 1970 non-binding United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
2675, which provided “[i]n the conduct of military operations, every effort should 
be made to spare the civilian populations from the ravages of war, and all necessary 
precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to the civilian 
populations.”128 
During the following year’s session, the Government Experts considered a 
draft protocol prepared by the ICRC that contained three articles dealing with 
precautions during international armed conflict.129 Although the phrase “constant 
care” did not appear in the draft, the concept’s inclusion in language similar to that 
                                                 
125 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57. 
126 In 1971, the ICRC convened a conference of 200 experts, representing forty-one states, to consult 
on the current state and potential development of international humanitarian law in armed conflict. 
The conference was a continuation of the ICRC’s effort to develop “concrete rules which would 
supplement humanitarian law in force.” INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF 
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT: REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 1 (24 May 
– 12 June 1971, 1st session) [hereinafter ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 
1]. 
127 3 ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 1, supra note 126, at 77. 
128 G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), ¶ 3 (Oct. 24, 1970) (setting forth basic principles for the protection of 
the civilian population during armed conflict). One of these principles stated that “[i]n the conduct 
of military operations, every effort should be made to spare the civilian populations from the ravages 
of war, and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to the civilian 
populations.” Id. 
129 2 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE 
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICT: REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 8 (3 May – 3 June 1972, 2nd session) 
[hereinafter ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 2]. 
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contained in Resolution 2675 was urged by the French delegation.130 Drawing on 
that discussion, the ICRC released an updated draft protocol and commentary 
thereto as preparatory material for the Diplomatic Conference of Government 
Representatives that began work in 1974 on the Additional Protocols.131 Article 50 
of the new draft contained a constant care provision identical to the one that would 
be adopted by the Diplomatic Conference in 1977 as Article 57(1). 
The ICRC commentary accompanying the draft article described the 
constant care provision as a “general rule governing the behavior of combatants 
with regard to the risks which military operations, and especially attacks, involve 
for protected persons.”132 Interestingly, the Conference record makes no mention 
of discussions about the requirement. Nevertheless, the ICRC Commentary to 
Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I characterizes it as supplementing the 
principle of distinction set forth in Article 48.133 
There is a degree of controversy over the scope of Article 57(1). To some, 
it is but a chapeau provision that is operationalized in the subsequent provisions of 
Article 57 dealing with attacks; thus, it has no independent normative effect beyond 
the planning and conduct of operations qualifying as “attacks,”134 a term denoting 
“acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence.”135 Textual 
support for this position is found in the title to the article, which refers only to 
attacks. 
By contrast, the ICRC Commentary to the provision explains that the term 
“military operations” encompasses “any movements, maneuvers and other 
activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat.”136 We 
agree, for it is sensible from a military perspective to always take the effect of one’s 
operations on the civilian population into account.137 The Commentary also styles 
the provision as “an important duty on belligerents,” that is, as imparting a legal 
obligation.138 The result is a duty for those who participate in military operations, 
including but not limited to attacks, to take the possibility of negative consequences 
for the civilian population and/or civilian objects into consideration.139 Subsequent 
explanations of the constant care provision by groups of experts and in military 
                                                 
130 Id. at 74. 
131 ICRC DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 1. 
132 Id. at 65. 
133 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2191; BOTHE, PARTSCH & 
SOLF, supra note 29, at 407. 
134 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.3.3. 
135 AP I, supra note 2, art. 49(1). 
136 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2191. 
137 See Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 
88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 797 (2006). 
138 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2191. 
139 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.32.1 (“So the commander will have to bear in mind the effect 
on the civilian population of what he is planning to do and take steps to reduce that effect as much 
as possible.”). 
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manuals confirm that the constant care provision is meant to impose an affirmative 
duty on parties to a conflict, albeit one that is general and rather ill-defined.140 
The obligation applies without reference to the issue of uncertainty as to 
whether civilians or civilian objects might be harmed during an operation. Rather, 
it is quite straightforward. Commanders and others with control over military 
operations cannot lawfully ignore any possibility of an impact on the civilian 
population. They may be able to dismiss the possibility very quickly, but the 
consideration thereof must always be part of the operational analysis. Should there 
be a potential negative effect, “feasible” precautions, a standard discussed below, 
have to be taken to avoid it. 
In addition to being a freestanding duty, the constant care requirement is 
meant to be put into “practical application” through specific precautionary 
requirements set forth in the reminder of Article 57.141 Unlike “constant care,” 
uncertainty plays a role in assessing whether these active precautions must be taken. 
As set forth textually, Article 57(2) obligates attackers to “[d]o everything feasible” 
to verify the target is a lawful military objective, select means and methods of 
warfare (weapons and tactics) that can be feasibly employed to minimize civilian 
harm, refrain from launching an attack that expected to breach the proportionality 
rule and to suspend or cancel an attack underway that is likely to do so, and provide 
advance warning of an attack that “may affect” the civilian population, “unless 
circumstance do not permit.”142 Article 57(3) adds a further requirement to assess 
whether a “similar military advantage” may be gained by attacking another target 
that would result in the “less danger” to civilians or civilian objects than striking 
the target under consideration; if so, attack must be against the former.143 
Uncertainty looms large with respect to such precautions because the 
options available to minimize civilian harm vary from attack to attack. Steps that 
can enhance verification range from relying on special forces in the vicinity of the 
target, to using sensors aboard aircraft and drones, to employing cyber means to 
map a targeted system, to consulting human intelligence reports. Characteristics of 
weapons that can minimize harm include, inter alia, the degree of blast effect, the 
precision, the guidance system the weapon relies upon, and the shift cold 
                                                 
140 See AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 142 (“‘Constant care’ means that there are no exceptions 
from the duty to seek to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”); see also DOD 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.2.3.5; U.K. MANUAL supra note 11, ¶ 5.32.1; TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 477 (noting the “broad general duty to ‘respect’ the civilian 
population, that is to consider deleterious effects of military operations on civilians”). Further, the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 states, “the duty of constant care requires commanders and all others involved 
in the operations to be continuously sensitive to the effects of their activities on the civilian 
population and civilian objects, and to seek to avoid any unnecessary effects thereon.” Id. 
141 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2191. 
142 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2). 
143 Id. art. 49(3). 
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capability.144 Certain tactics can also, depending on the situation, avoid harm to 
civilians and civilian objects. These include, for instance, adjusting the angle of 
attack or altitude of release and tracking a target until it is away from civilians or 
civilian objects. They also embrace disabling a system temporarily to cause an 
effect during a desired timeframe (e.g., by cyber means), rather than physically 
destroying it. And choice of target can be critical in preventing civilian harm. To 
illustrate, if the effect sought is disruption of power, it might avoid civilian harm to 
incapacitate transmission wires (employing carbon filament bombs) serving the 
military objective, rather than attack an electrical generating station, damage to 
which risks widespread effects throughout the civilian population that relies on it. 
As to when IHL requires the taking of such measures, there are two steps in 
the decision process. The first is to determine if an attacker is obliged to consider 
the taking of precautions at all. This varies depending on the type of precaution 
involved. 
With respect to verification of the target’s status, the earlier discussion of 
uncertainty as to whether the target is a military objective applies fully. However, 
even after determining to the requisite degree of certainty in the circumstances that 
the target is a military objective, an attacker must still employ feasible means of 
verification to attempt to resolve any remaining doubt. This requirement reflects 
the fact that the duty to take active precautions is in addition to the obligation to 
determine the target is a lawful one; so long as doubt remains, the attacker must 
exhaust feasible means of verification even if the target has been identified as a 
military objective to the extent necessary for the target identification set forth 
above. Any uncertainty lying above the threshold of mere speculation that the target 
might not be a valid military objective triggers the duty.  
Attachment of the precautionary obligations with respect to choice of means 
and methods of warfare and to choice among military objectives depends on 
whether there is collateral damage that might be avoided by using a different 
weapon or tactic or striking a target other than that originally selected in order to 
achieve the effect sought.145 It is essential to understand that the collateral damage 
to which these rules apply does not render the attack in violation of the rule of 
proportionality (because otherwise the attack itself would be unlawful), but 
nevertheless could be avoided by feasible changes in weapon, tactic or target. These 
                                                 
144 For a discussion of the “shift cold” tactic, see Michael Schmitt & Matthew King, The “Shift 
Cold” Military Tactic and International Humanitarian Law, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/52198/shift-cold-tactic-international-humanitarian-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/H4K5-TRH6]. 
145 AP I, supra note 2, arts. 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(3). The choice of targets requirement found within 
Article 57(3) is framed in terms of options to reduce the “danger to civilian lives and to civilian 
objects,” which is slightly different than “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects.” 
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precautions must be considered in the face of any likelihood of causing the requisite 
harm that is more than speculative.  
Article 57’s two references to the rule of proportionality146 do not raise 
certainty issues, except as explained above with respect to that rule. They serve as 
reminders that the requirement to consider proportionality extends throughout the 
attack and to all those who can exercise control over it. As to application of the 
provisions, the earlier discussion of proportionality applies mutatis mutandis. 
The second, and more significant, task is identifying those possible 
precautions that have to be taken. With respect to choice of means or methods, the 
answer is found in the text of the relevant provision. Only precautions that are 
“feasible” need be taken. Thus, the meaning of feasibility lies at the heart of that 
obligation.  
Feasibility also impliedly informs Article 57(3)’s obligation to choose from 
among military objectives the target that is likely to cause the least loss of civilian 
life or damage to civilian objects without lessening the probability of achieving the 
desired effect. On its face, the phrase “[w]hen a choice is possible” would appear 
to suggest a higher standard than feasibility, for the very function of a feasibility 
caveat, as will be explained, is to counter suggestions that all possible measures 
must be taken as a matter of law. Logically, though, the provision cannot impose a 
requirement to take other than feasible precautions. For example, as will be seen, 
the fact that an attacker has to assume greater risk to take a precaution is a factor to 
be considered when deciding whether the use of a particular weapon is feasible. It 
would be incongruous to suggest that the same would not hold true with respect to 
selecting a different target. 
Moreover, treaties are to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
light of their object and purpose.”147 Context includes other text of the treaty,148 the 
relevant text in this case being Articles 57(2)(a)(i) and 57(2)(a)(ii), both of which 
reference feasibility. Recall also that the object and purpose of IHL treaties is to 
craft an appropriate balance between military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations. It would contravene this object and purpose if, for instance, an 
attacker was required to attack a different target than planned in order to avoid the 
chance of only marginally greater collateral damage when doing so would be highly 
risky. Plainly, a feasibility condition must be read into the provision. 
This raises the question of the meaning of feasible. Additional Protocol I 
does not define the term. However, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons provides that it refers to “those precautions which are practicable or 
practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, 
                                                 
146 AP I, supra note 2, arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
147 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
148 Id. art. 31(2). 
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including humanitarian and military considerations.”149 The definition was 
accepted as equally appropriate for interpretation of the term in Additional Protocol 
I by a number of states when they later ratified that instrument, including the U.K. 
and France.150 Its emphasis on the contextual nature of the feasibility requirement 
and its confirmation that military considerations factor into the assessment rule out 
any argument that every possible precautionary measure must be taken. 
Interestingly, it took some time to overcome the yearning for an absolutist 
approach by which every possible precaution must be taken to avoid civilian harm. 
The ICRC’s non-binding 1956 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers 
Incurred by the Civilian Population in the Time of War, for example, provided that 
“[a]ll possible precautions shall be taken . . . to ensure that no losses or damage are 
caused to the civilian population in the vicinity of the [military] objective . . . or 
that such losses or damage are at least reduced to a minimum.”151 Later, the 1971 
meeting of the Conference of Government Experts, in a compilation of “Basic 
Rules,” similarly set forth the obligation in rather absolute terms by providing that 
an attacker “must take the necessary precautions.”152 At the following year’s 
session, the draft protocol likewise used unqualified terminology (“shall 
ensure”).153 Yet, during debate over the draft article, several of the experts argued 
that articulating the precaution obligations in “absolute” terms would be 
unworkable militarily and active precautions should be stated with “more flexible 
wording.”154 They recommended a formulation expressed in terms of “reasonable 
precautions.”155 
In preparation for the Diplomatic Conference and building on the work of 
the Conference of Government Experts, the ICRC crafted new draft protocols. Draft 
                                                 
149 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons art. 1(5), Oct. 10, 
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. 
150 United Kingdom, Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, 28 January 1998, § b (UK); France, Declarations and Reservations Made Upon 
Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 4 November 2001, ¶ 3. 
151 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1956 DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE DANGERS 
INCURRED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE TIME OF WAR 10 (1956) [hereinafter 1956 DRAFT 
RULES]. 
152 3 ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 1 supra note 126, at 136–37. 
153 2 ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 2, supra note 129, at 8 (noting that 
this Draft Article did not contain a companion provision regarding means and methods). 
154 1 ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 2, supra note 129, at 152. Of course, 
in certain operations where the avoidance of civilian harm is essential, particularly during 
counterinsurgencies in which the support of the civilian population is essential, a party to the conflict 
may require the taking of every precaution as a matter of policy and good operational sense. For 
instance, in Vietnam, the U.S. 1971 Rules of Engagement provided “[a]ll possible means will be 
employed to limit the risk to the lives and property of friendly forces and civilians.” U.S. MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIET-NAM, DIRECTIVE NUMBER 525–13, DATED MAY 1971: RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIREPOWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, para. 6(a) 
(1971), reprinted in ELEANOR C. MCDOWELL, OFF. OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, 814, 815 (1975). 
155 1 ICRC CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, SESSION 2, supra note 129, at 152. 
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Article 50, entitled “Precautions in the Attack,” presented the delegates with a 
choice between a target verification obligation that was absolute in nature and one 
limited to circumstances of reasonability.156 As to choice of “weapons and 
methods,” the draft article required an attacker to take “all necessary precautions” 
to limit incidental loss.157 However, the accompanying commentary explained that 
the provision amounted to an obligation “to consider and weigh . . . probable or 
possible effects on the civilian population” in light of various humanitarian and 
military factors.158 
During the Diplomatic Conference, the target verification and means and 
methods precaution obligations were accepted as “qualified” obligations, limited 
by feasibility.159 The Rapporteur observed that the delegates preferred the term 
“feasible” over “reasonable,” for some of them saw the latter as overly 
subjective,160 whereas feasible “was intended to mean that which is practicable or 
practically possible.”161 Noting that certain delegates stated that they understood 
the phrase to mean “everything that was practicable or practically possible, taking 
into account all the circumstances at the time of attack, including those relevant to 
the success of military operations,” the Additional Protocol Commentary to Article 
57, addressing the possibility of military considerations being exploited to 
outweigh humanitarian obligations, stated that “interpretation will be a matter of 
common sense and good faith.”162 Subsequent expert commentaries are generally 
in accord with the approach taken in Article 57,163 which the ICRC’s Customary 
International Humanitarian Law study found to be reflective of customary 
international law.164 
Numerous military manuals offer practical guidance on considerations that 
bear on feasibility. That of the Netherlands, for instance, observes, “the extent that 
commanders and their staff . . . may be bound by these rules [on precautions in the 
attack] depends on three specific factors: freedom of choice of means and methods; 
availability of intelligence; available time.”165 The U.K. Manual proffers a list of 
                                                 
156 ICRC DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 64; BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra 
note 29, at 404–05. 
157 ICRC DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 64. 
158 Id. at 66 The factors listed in the draft commentary were: location of the persons and objects 
concerned (in the immediate vicinity of a military objective), the configuration of the terrain (danger 
of landslide, of ricocheting, etc.), the accuracy of the weapons used (relative dispersion according 
to trajectory, firing range, ammunition used, etc.), meteorological conditions (visibility, effect of 
wind, etc.), the specific nature of the military objectives (ammunition stores, fuel tanks, army 
nuclear stations, etc.), and combatants’ mastery of techniques. Id. at 65. 
159 BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 29, at 404. 
160 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 27, at 353. 
161 Id. at 285; see also BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 29, at 404–05. 
162 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, ¶ 2198. Interestingly, the 
Commentary acknowledged that reasonable precautions are “slightly different from and a little less 
far reaching” than feasible precautions, but it also found the distinction “tenuous” at best. Id. ¶ 2230. 
163 See AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 143–46; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 478–81. 
164 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 15. 
165 KONINKLIJKE MILITAIRE ACADEMIE, TOEPASSING HUMANITAIR OORLOGSRECHT: VS 27-412/1 
V-11 (1993). 
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non-exhaustive factors for consideration when determining the choice of means and 
methods of attack: 
a. the importance of the target and the urgency of the situation; 
b. intelligence about the proposed target—what it is being, or will 
be, used for and when; 
c. the characteristics of the target itself, for example, whether it 
houses dangerous forces; 
d. what weapons are available, their range, accuracy, and radius of 
effect; 
e. conditions affecting the accuracy of targeting, such as terrain, 
weather, and time of day; 
f. factors affecting incidental loss or damage, such as the proximity 
of civilians or civilian objects in the vicinity of the target or other 
protected objects or zones and whether they are inhabited, or the 
possible release of hazardous substances as a result of the attack; 
g. the risks to [the commander’s] own troops of the various options 
open to him.166 
So too does the DoD Manual:  
Circumstances ruling at the time may include: (1) the effect of taking 
the precaution on mission accomplishment; (2) whether taking the 
precaution poses a risk to one’s own forces or presents other security 
risks;167 (3) the likelihood and degree of humanitarian benefit from 
taking the precaution; (4) the cost of taking the precaution, in terms 
of time, money, or other resources; (5) or whether taking the 
precaution forecloses alternative courses of action.168 
                                                 
166 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.32.5. 
167 In further discussion of this point, the DoD Law of War Manual cites to the U.S. response to an 
ICRC memorandum regarding the applicability of IHL to any armed conflict resulting between Iraq 
and Coalition states. The U.S. defined feasible precautions as “reasonable precautions, consistent 
with mission accomplishment and allowable risk to attacking forces.” 2 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1991–1999, 2063. The United States also drew a distinction 
between the prevention of incidental injury of civilians and collateral damage to civilian property, 
viewing the latter as of lesser concern. In accordance with this view, the United States took the 
position that “[m]easures to minimize collateral damage to civilian objects should not include steps 
that will place U.S. and allied lives at greater or unnecessary risk.” Id. at 2064. 
168 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.2.3.2. 
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In a feasibility determination, the value of each factor is derived from the 
specific circumstances surrounding the attack.169 This point has generated a degree 
of debate, particularly concerning precautions that present increased risk to 
attacking force. Some authors have argued, for instance, that an attacking force is 
under no legal obligation to assume increased risk in order to avoid harm to 
civilians or civilian objects; any such increase renders a precautionary measure 
infeasible.170 
This is an extreme position, and one that does not comport with the military 
necessity-humanitarian considerations balancing that underlies IHL. The better 
view is that while the extent to which a possible precaution increases the risk to an 
attacking force is an appropriate military factor in determining whether it is feasible 
in the attendant circumstances, the fact of increased risk to the attacking force, by 
itself, does not necessarily displace the obligation to take precautions.171  
Certainty issues enter the feasibility determination during assessment of the 
respective value to be attributed to military and humanitarian considerations. With 
regard to military considerations, the key issue is the extent to which taking the 
active precaution(s) might negatively affect the desired effect of an attack, whether 
that effect is tangible or not. To illustrate, consider the use of a small-diameter 
bomb that will cause less collateral damage when employed in a particular situation 
than a bomb filled with a greater amount of explosive. However, because its blast 
effect is smaller, the certainty of achieving the desired effect drops. That loss of 
certainty of achieving the effect is a military consideration to be factored into the 
feasibility assessment. 
Likewise, consider physical risk to the attacking force. Risk has both a 
qualitative and a quantitative element. The former is about what is being risked, 
and the latter is about certainty in the sense of how probable it is that the risk will 
manifest. Thus, the magnitude of harm to one’s own forces has to be considered in 
light of the probability of that harm occurring. 
Military considerations in the feasibility context must be assessed broadly. 
For instance, they include opportunity costs that might result from the use of a 
particular weapon that is in short supply and might prove more useful during later 
phases in the conflict. Or consider force orientation. Attacking a moving target in a 
                                                 
169 See Study Group, supra note 96, at 378. 
170 WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 123 (2012) (citing Hamutal Esther Shamash, 
How Much Is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of Jus in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISR. 
DEF. FORCES L. REV. 103, 125 (2005–2006)). Although not referring directly to precautions, see 
also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Kosovo, Casualty Aversion, and the American Military Ethos: A 
Perspective, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 95, 99–101 (1999–2000). 
171 See Study Group, supra note 96, at 378; DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 168; ROGERS, supra note 
18, at 137. See also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.2.3.2 (“For example, a 
commander may determine that a precaution would not be feasible because it would result in 
increased operational risk or an increased risk to his or her forces.”). However, this does not mean 
that any increased risk to the commander’s forces, by itself, automatically makes a precaution 
infeasible. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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location that will risk less collateral damage than the one initially chosen for attack 
could result in the enemy repositioning forces in a manner disadvantageous to an 
attacker. The point is that military considerations are contextual and holistic. 
A similar dynamic is at work with respect to the causation of collateral 
damage. As noted earlier, the mere possibility of collateral damage triggers the 
obligation to consider ways to minimize it. But the extent of collateral damage and 
the degree to which it is likely to occur factor into the decision as to whether the 
alternative is feasible. In the previous example, assume that additional possible 
collateral damage caused by using the larger bomb is only marginally greater. The 
chance that resort to the smaller weapon will avoid causing the harm is 
correspondingly limited.  
The following equation illustrates operation of the feasibility condition, 
describing when a precaution is not feasible: 
Σ [VNMC ∙ PNMC] excessive to Σ [VCIV ∙ PCD] 
VNMC denotes the value of negative military considerations, PNMC is the probability 
of those negative military considerations occurring, and VCIV ∙ PCD, as in 
proportionality, represents civilian concerns. By this equation, the feasibility of 
taking a precaution lies along a sliding scale that takes into account not only 
possible collateral damage in light of its likelihood of occurrence, but also any risk 
of a negative non-speculative effect on the attacker’s military operations, also 
considered in light of the chance of that negative effect occurring. If the latter is not 
excessive relative to the collateral damage risk, the precaution is feasible; 
otherwise, it is not. 
It is important to avoid underestimating the significance of the negative 
military considerations. We have adapted the term “excessive” from the 
proportionality equation to emphasize this point. The equation is not meant to be a 
finely tuned balancing test. Indeed, recall that we are not suggesting that any of the 
formulae proffered are mathematical determinations; rather, they are merely 
cognitive frameworks. Thus, the decision as to whether the precaution in question 
is feasible depends, adapting the Harvard Manual’s excessiveness explanation 
cited above,172 on the extent to which the risk, in quantitative and qualitative terms, 
of negative impact on the attacker’s military operations significantly outbalances 
the quantitative and qualitative risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects should 
the precaution be taken. 
The appropriateness of imposing an excessiveness condition is buoyed by 
Article 57(3), which only requires the precaution of choosing among military 
objectives when those objectives would obtain a “similar military advantage.” This 
demonstrates IHL’s sensitivity to military considerations, for, by the article, even 
if choosing another target might significantly reduce civilian deaths and damage to 
                                                 
172 AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 27-28, 98; MELZER, supra note 121, at 360. 
188 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
civilian objects, that precaution need not be taken if there is a significant impact on 
achieving the attack’s desired effect. 
Both sides of the equation are set forth as a summation of individual 
assessments. For instance, some precautions, such as ensuring ground forces have 
“eyes on” a target before attacking, may both imperil the soldiers concerned and 
risk not achieving the desired effect because of the time required for those soldiers 
to be in place to visually identify the target. On the other side of the equation, failure 
to take a precaution under consideration, as was the case with proportionality 
calculations, may risk harm of differing likelihood to individual civilians or civilian 
objects. 
Analogous sensitivity appears with respect to the final precaution in attack 
set out in Article 57, the obligation to warn the civilian population of an attack if it 
is to be affected thereby. The obligation is widely accepted as having a customary 
law character173 and is recognized in military manuals174 and expert restatements 
of law.175 Based on treaty text and state practice, warnings are subject to different 
standards of application than other precautions.176 
First, the threshold at which warnings must be considered is low, not in 
terms of certainty, but rather with respect to the nature of the harm risked. Whereas 
the other specific precautions apply only to civilian harm qualifying as collateral 
damage (see above), there is a requirement to warn whenever the civilian 
population could be “affected” by a planned attack. The latter is a much lower 
threshold than “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian 
objects,” which applies to precautionary measures in the choice of means and 
methods, or “danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects,” the standard for taking 
precautionary measures involving choice of target. Despite the difference, the same 
certainty of risk threshold applies. So long as affecting the civilian population is 
likelier than mere speculation, warnings must be considered. 
Second, military considerations appear to loom especially large in 
determining whether a warning of attack, whether general in nature or specific to 
the attack itself, must be issued. The contemporary warning requirement reflected 
in Article 57(2)(c) first took firm hold in the 1956 Draft Rules, Article 8 of which 
required a belligerent to “whenever the circumstances allow, warn the civilian 
population in jeopardy . . . .”177 It was understood that the requirement to warn was 
                                                 
173 1 CIHL STUDY, supra note 2, r. 20. 
174 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 5.11.5. 
175 AMW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 153–56; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 484–85. 
176 Geoffrey S. Corn & James A. Schoettler, Jr., Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: The 
Essential Role of Precautionary Measures, 223 MIL. L. REV. 785, 815 (2015); Study Group, supra 
note 96, at 385–88. 
177 1956 DRAFT RULES, supra note 151, at 10. Note that in earlier times, warnings had been 
considered required in certain circumstances. For instance, Article 26 of the Regulations attached to 
the 1907 Hague Convention IV provided that “[t]he officer in command of an attacking force must, 
before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the 
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limited and that the necessity of surprise “is the military commander’s ‘trump card’, 
and, in many cases, circumstances do not permit the person ordering the attack to 
warn the population.”178 Nevertheless, the warning requirement was deemed 
constructive because it, at a minimum, required a belligerent to consider the 
possibility of issuing a warning to the civilian population.179 
Although not a topic of extensive discussion among the delegates at the 
Diplomatic Conference, the Committee working on precautions faced a choice 
between the phrases “when circumstances permit” and “unless circumstances do 
not permit.”180 The former was understood to imply that a warning would only 
sometimes be possible, whereas the latter indicated that it typically would be 
possible to issue one.181 “Unless circumstances do not permit” was adopted, thereby 
confirming a presumption that warnings are to be given.182 Nevertheless, the caveat 
acknowledged the significance of the military considerations that previously had 
animated the 1956 Draft Rules. 
There are a number of reasons circumstances might not permit effective 
warnings. Of fundamental concern, however, are two problems for an attacking 
force. The first is risk to the attacking force itself. If the defender knows an attack 
is looming, it can position its defenses in a manner that will often dramatically 
increase the peril to the attacking force. Such increased risk leads to the second 
problem, that loss of surprise hinders mission success. This is so not only because 
the attacking force is placed at greater risk, but also because the target can be 
hardened or moved or, if an individual, flee the target area. 
These realities are universally understood as contextualizing the warning 
requirement. The ICRC Commentary to Article 57, for instance, notes that the 
degree to which the “element of surprise in the attack is a condition of its success” 
was an underlying justification for the exception to the warning requirement,183 
while the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law study found that, in 
addition to the need for surprise in the success of an attack, state practice also 
accounts for the degree to which surprise is “essential . . . to the security of the 
                                                 
authorities.” Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention 
No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 26, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. 
No. 539. Once warned, it was assumed the authorities would take measures to safeguard the civilian 
population. See, e.g., U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 art. 19, Apr. 24, 1863; Project of an International 
Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels art. 16, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted 
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004); 
Institute of International Law, The Laws of War on Land art. 33 (1880) (Oxford Manual), reprinted 
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 29. 
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attacking forces or that of friendly forces.”184 Expert commentaries have similarly 
given surprise a place of prominence when determining whether warnings are 
required prior to an attack.185 
As numerous scholars have observed, warnings generally result in 
disadvantage for the attacking force.186 In light of this self-evident reality of 
warfare, the question is when must warnings be given despite the risk of negative 
consequences. Although other factors are relevant, there is almost universal 
acceptance of the premise that loss of the element of surprise is the paradigmatic 
example of a situation justifying an attack without warning. 
Indeed, the relatively scant state practice of warning tends to come in two 
forms. First are those situations involving warnings to the civilian population of 
attacks in general, warnings so broad that the loss of surprise has little influence on 
the likelihood of mission success.187 An example would be the general warnings 
issued by coalition forces via airdropped pamphlets urging civilians to stay away 
from Iraqi military sites prior to the start of hostilities in 2003.188 The second 
situation is one in which the target is immovable, as in the case of a building, and 
can be attacked with impunity because the defender lacks the means to place the 
attacker at risk. Israeli practices of phoning, texting or “roof knocking” to urge 
civilians to leave buildings that are about to be targeted are illustrative.189 In such 
cases, it usually cannot be said that circumstances prevent issuing a warning. 
The relative dearth of warning practice in other situations appears to run 
contrary to the fact that, as discussed, Article 57 was intended to create a rebuttable 
presumption that civilians must be warned, an intent that has been reaffirmed since 
then even with respect to surprise.190 In our view, the mere fact of somewhat 
compromised surprise or other military considerations is insufficient, without more, 
to rebut this presumption, for allowing any loss of tactical initiative to justify 
dispensing with the warning requirement would result in an exception that would 
effectively swallow the rule. 
Ultimately, determining when it is appropriate to forego a warning is highly 
situational; such assessments are judged against what an objective, reasonable 
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commander would decide under the attendant circumstances. To illustrate, assume 
an air attack planned against a building in which many civilians are located. If 
warned, they can be expected to depart. However, the warning will also permit the 
defenders to place effective air defenses in the target area. Because of the risk posed 
to the aircraft, the attacker will have to use indirect artillery fire against the target, 
which will slightly diminish the likelihood of success in striking the building with 
the desired effect. Depending on the extent to which the expectation of success 
declines and the degree and likelihood of civilian harm avoided by the warning, a 
reasonable commander might conclude one can be issued, or not. 
Uncertainty also enters the assessment with respect to the fact that the 
requisite warning must be, as noted in the text of Article 57(2)(c), “effective.” An 
effective warning is one that will place the civilian population on notice of the 
attack and allow it to take measures to protect itself from the effects of that attack.191 
However, warnings can prove ineffective, or only partially effective, for many 
reasons. Warnings sent by cyber means, for example, rely on functioning cyber 
infrastructure and the target population being connected to the systems used to 
deliver the warnings. Similarly, notifying the affected population through 
authorities in the target area is only effective when those authorities will pass on 
the warning in an efficacious manner. And the effectiveness of leaflets can be 
limited if used to warn a widely illiterate population. These and similar factors are 
appropriate for consideration when deciding whether warning the civilian 
population of an attack is obligatory. 
The cognitive framework for determining whether a warning must be issued 
can be represented thusly. Since there is a presumption that warnings will be issued, 
the formula denotes when warnings are not required because military 
considerations reasonably rebut the presumption. 
∑ [VNMC ∙ PNMC] excessive relative to ∑ [VNECP ∙ PNECP]192 
As before, VNMC signifies the value of negative military considerations, while PNMC 
is the probability of those negative military considerations occurring. Especially 
significant in the warning context is the extent to which warnings pose a risk to 
mission success or the safety of the attacking force and its equipment. The equation 
indicates that both the severity of the consequences and the likelihood thereof are 
relevant. For instance, while the severity of negative considerations, such as pilot 
loss, may be high, if the likelihood thereof is low, a highly effective and protective 
warning may be required. Likelihood is, of course, affected by the nature of the 
warnings and their specificity. General warnings of attack, as an example, usually 
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pose less of a threat to attacking forces than highly specific ones and therefore the 
probability of the negative military consequences would be lower for the former in 
most cases. It must be cautioned that warnings can generate deleterious military 
consequences in a number of ways. To illustrate, a warning that results in the 
downing of an attacking aircraft has a negative effect on the success of that 
particular mission and from a force protection perspective. It is appropriate to 
consider both in determining whether to warn, a fact represented in the framework 
as a sum of military considerations. 
VNECP denotes the value of negative effects on the civilian population, and 
PNECP is the probability of those negative effects manifesting. NECP is used in lieu 
of CD because effects that would not qualify as collateral damage in the 
proportionality or other active precautions sense must nevertheless be considered. 
As with negative military considerations, the gravity and probability of negative 
consequences for the civilian population are relevant considerations in the warning 
obligation determination. And also, as with negative military consequences, the 
probability of the effects would depend in great part on the nature of the warning(s) 
in question and the likely effectiveness thereof.  
And as with the feasibility equation, the warning equation is expressed in 
terms of sums. Because a single attack may generate multiple negative military 
considerations, as with loss of the pilot and aircraft and loss of the effect sought in 
the attack, an attacker may consider the sum of the value and probability of all 
negative military considerations. The same is true with respect to negative effects 
on the civilian population. For instance, the failure to evacuate a hospital due to the 
lack of warning might result in injury to those therein and damage to the facility, 
as well as possible loss of future medical care for the civilian population. 
Accordingly, both sides of the equation employ the sum symbol ∑. 
Finally, as with feasibility considerations, there is a wide margin of 
appreciation when determining whether “circumstances do not permit” warnings. 
But unlike feasibility, here a clear presumption exists that warnings will be given, 
a point confirmed by use of the term “unless.” Therefore, the equation indicates 
that the negative military considerations must be excessive before they sufficiently 
outweigh the effect on the civilian population to negate the requirement to provide 
a warning. 
V. Concluding Thoughts 
We have not attempted to solve the perennial problem of how to address the 
uncertainty in targeting that haunts those involved in lethal and destructive 
operations during warfare. Rather, this article simply offers a cognitive framework 
for dealing with the reality of uncertainty, one drawing on treaties, legal 
commentary, practice, and simple logic. In doing so, it rejects the notion that 
definitive thresholds, such as those found in domestic criminal or civil legal 
regimes, are to be found in international humanitarian law when ascertaining 
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whether a person or object is a military objective, an attack is proportionate or 
precautions in attack are required.  
On the contrary, by our approach every situation must be considered on its 
own merits in light of the attendant circumstances. This fact is reflected in the 
resulting formulae, summarized below.  
Target Identification 
VDE ∙ PDE > VUH ∙ PUH193 
 
Proportionality 
Σ [VCIV ∙ PCD] excessive relative to [VDE ∙ PDE]194 
 
Precautions Not Feasible 
Σ [VNMC ∙ PNMC] excessive to Σ [VCIV ∙ PCD]195 
 
Warnings not Required 
∑ [VNMC ∙ PNMC] excessive relative to ∑ [VNECP ∙ PNECP]196 
 
The formulae are meant only to mind map our proposed frameworks. They 
are not susceptible to formulaic application. In particular, we eschew any attempt 
to apply them mathematically, for the factors we have highlighted for consideration 
defy clear quantification. As a result, there is a significant margin of appreciation 
in their application. 
                                                 
193 (Value of desired effect) considered in light of (probability of achieving desired effect) greater 
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Moreover, the cognitive frameworks are strictly legal in character. At no 
time did we consider moral or policy concerns. Situations may exist on the 
battlefield in which those concerns lead to treating uncertainty more restrictively 
than the law requires. This is certainly the case, for instance, when conducting 
counter-insurgency operations, the success of which may depend on the support of 
the civilian population, or at least denying the enemy its support. 
In this regard, our approach to interpretation of the relevant law is based on 
the premise that law must be interpreted in light of the context in which it is to be 
applied and with sensitivity to its object and purpose. In the case of IHL, this 
endeavor demands fidelity to the foundational goal of balancing military necessity 
and humanitarian concerns. Thus, we have attempted to fully appreciate the 
dialectical relationship between potential operational and humanitarian 
consequences. Proposed approaches that exaggerate or neglect either side of the 
dynamic are doomed to eventual rejection. 
Finally, we merely hope to open a more robust dialogue on how to factor 
uncertainty into decisions to attack, or refrain from attacking, targets, whether they 
be individuals or objects. The cognitive frameworks set forth may have neglected 
key factors for consideration, skewed the analysis inappropriately or simply be 
wrong. We believe not, but are prepared to accept such possibilities. Whatever the 
case, the dialogue must be opened, and it must be sophisticated. After all, 
uncertainty on the battlefield is nothing less than a matter of life and death. 
